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THE NEXUS OF THE TIP: THE PROPER
ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY AND CONTRACT
RIGHTS TO THE TIP
Matthew I. Knepper*1
I. INTRODUCTION
The act of tipping defies explanation under traditional economic models.
While the tip is voluntary in nature, it is difficult to ascertain precisely what
consumers receive in return. Even more difficult to determine is exactly who or
what the consumer is tipping. Is it the person he hands the tip to, or is it the
underlying service giving rise to the tip? This question is the basis for two
lawsuits, which as of the time of this writing are making their way through
Nevada’s state and federal courts.
These cases illustrate the difficult nature of determining the respective
rights of parties to the tip. Section I of this Note develops a theory to assist the
practitioner in conceptualizing those rights. I call this theory the “Nexus of the
Tip.” Section II reviews the historical underpinning and the current practice of
tipping, and also reviews the social and economic literature that has attempted
to describe the contours of the custom. Section II.A will introduce the reader to
the tipping bestowment inquiry, which defines initial parameters for determin-
ing how and to whom a consumer intends to tip. Section II.B introduces the
reader to the alternative to the tip, the service charge. This is a flat fee, which a
business will either charge per consumer or as a percentage of listed menu
prices. Through this discussion, the reader will come to understand why the tip
remains the preferred policy among employers.
Section III will introduce the reader to the Nexus of the Tip model. Sec-
tion III.A merges the notion of the bestowment inquiry with a consideration of
when the consumer’s property rights in the tip transfer to either the server, or to
the employer, depending on one’s viewpoint. Section III.A.1 considers the
transfer from the viewpoint of the employee who receives the tip directly from
the consumer. If the practitioner seeks to attack from this perspective she will
appreciate the compelling arguments that may be made through the lens of
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Special thanks to Judge Bruce A. Markell, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of
Nevada, and Professor Nancy Rapoport of the William S. Boyd School of Law for their
invaluable insight on this Note. I would also like to thank my wife, Jennifer, for her patience,
support, and dedication throughout my time at Boyd.
1 Prior to attending law school, I was in the restaurant business for twenty years; each and
every one as a restaurant server. I have worked in virtually every restaurant conceivable.
Sizzler, TGI Fridays, and ultimately for some of the most highly acclaimed chefs in the
world, including: Mark Franz, Michael Mina, Gary Danko & Alain Ducasse (Mr. Ducasse is
the only chef in history to hold nineteen Michelin Stars throughout his career).
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donative transfer. On the other hand, if the practitioner seeks to defend from the
perspective of the employer, she will want to understand how state law confers
the status of trustee upon the employer, and how from the employer’s perspec-
tive this is beneficial. This is the subject matter of Section III.A.2 and 3.
Section III.B applies the Nexus of the Tip model to circumstances where
the beneficiaries displace the state law trust approach in favor of contracts. Las
Vegas is unique in that it features union contracts that do this. However, the
terms in those contracts create traps for the unwary. That is, where the terms
allow tipped employees to decide among themselves how and to whom they
will secondarily tip, those same terms can confer the status of third-party bene-
ficiary on the secondarily-tipped employees. This is the subject matter of Sec-
tion III.B.1. In Section III.B.2, the analysis looks in detail at implications
illustrated in litigation arising in late 2010, between Wynn Las Vegas and its
unionized employees at its Tryst and XS nightclubs. Thus, the subject matter
examined in this Note is both timely and relevant to today’s practitioner.
II. THE HISTORY AND CUSTOM OF TIPPING
Consumers often voluntarily give tips in the form of a monetary payment
to workers who have performed services for them. The tipping custom is thus
distinguishable from other economic transactions, because unlike tipping, most
other economic exchanges involve specific obligations enforced under basic
notions of contract law. If a consumer wants to obtain a particular good or
service performance, he will have to perform by paying the price a seller speci-
fies. Without paying the seller, the consumer will get nothing in return. Alter-
natively, if he were to steal the good, or accept performance of the service and
then fail to pay for it, the seller’s conversion rights become legally enforceable.
In contrast, the tipping custom features obligations that are enforced by social
norms and individual conscience.2 The voluntary nature of the tip defies expla-
nation under traditional economic models, because while consumers presuma-
bly act in their own self-interest it remains unclear what they receive in return.3
The amount of monetary value derived from the tipping custom in the
United States cannot be ignored. Under the 2007 U.S. Economic Census data,
the aggregate gratuity in full-service restaurants may be estimated at $28.8 bil-
lion annually.4 While this number is limited to tips derived from full-service
restaurants, one 1993 study found that the tipping custom extended to as many
as thirty-three service professions.5 The estimation from the U.S. Census could
be more accurately described by the IRS but for the fact that tipped income is
2 Yoram Margalioth, The Social Norm of Tipping, Its Correlation with Inequality, and Dif-
ferences in Tax Treatment Across Countries, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 561, 562 (2010).
3 Id.
4 2007 Economic Census: Sector 72: Accommodation and Food Services: Subject Series –
Misc. Subjects: Average Cost Per Meal for the United States and States: 2007, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2010), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=&-
ds_name=EC0772SXSB02&-_lang=en. I make the calculation by multiplying the total sales
for all full-service restaurants nationally ($192 billion) by 15%. Thus, I arrive at $28.8
billion.
5 Michael Lynn et al., Consumer Tipping: A Cross-Country Study, 20 J. CONSUMER RES.
478, 482 (1993).
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so underreported in the United States. In fact, the only category of income more
underreported than tipping is illegal income.6
The origins of the tipping custom are attributable to sixteenth-century
England’s coffee houses.7 At that time, the coffee houses, known as penny
universities, featured brass urns bearing the inscription: “To Insure Prompti-
tude.”8 This practice developed further over the next two centuries whereby the
London coffee houses’ customers gave their waiters notes bearing the inscrip-
tion “To Insure Promptitude” with coins attached.9 By the early nineteenth-
century tipping had become common in hotels as well.10
It was not until the late eighteenth-century that tipping made its way to the
shores of America.11 Its export to the U.S. is attributed to affluent Americans
who traveled to Europe and had to tip there.12 When they brought the custom
home, it was met with heavy opposition.13 The reason for this was that the tip
was viewed as fostering the master-servant relationship in a nation built on
egalitarian values.14 Both consumer and worker groups opposed tipping by
arguing that tipping ultimately disfavored its recipients because employers
were reducing workers’ wages and allowing the tips to compensate them for the
difference.15 Though several states had responded in opposition to the tipping
custom by outlawing it in the early twentieth-century, these laws were largely
abolished under pressure from employers, and under the largely held belief that
attempts to abolish it were useless.16 Indeed, today the practice has become
commonplace. In fact, since 1982 where the average tip rate in U.S. restaurants
was 14.4%, the average has steadily grown to 19% as of 2007.17
The reasons why consumers tip are less certain than the fact of the cus-
tom’s historical development in the U.S. The rationales may be expressed as a
desire for good service in the future,18 a desire of social approval,19 or as a
desire to equitably compensate workers for their service.20 Other rationales
suggest that tipping: (1) reduces anxiety in tippers in regard to being the target
6 DAVID HEMENWAY, PRICES AND CHOICES: MICROECONOMIC VIGNETTES 80 (3d ed. 1993).
7 Ofer H. Azar, The History of Tipping—From Sixteenth-Century England to the United
States in the 1910’s, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 745, 752 (2004).
8 Id. at 752-53.
9 Id. at 753 (citing J.E. SCHEIN ET AL., THE ART OF TIPPING: CUSTOMS AND CONTROVERSIES
19 (1984)).
10 Id.  at 754 (citing R.A. Crouch, Tips, CORNHILL MAG., 1936, at 154, 544-45 (quoting a
late seventeenth-century journalist as saying: “If a man who has a horse puts up at an inn,
besides his usual bill, he must give at least one shilling to the waiter, sixpence each to the
chambermaid, the ostler and the jackboot, making together half a crown. If the traveler only
puts up to have refreshment, besides paying for his horse’s standing, he has to give away in
the day another half-crown, which makes five shillings in the day to the servants.”).
11 Margalioth, supra note 2, at 563.
12 Azar, supra note 7, at 754.
13 Margalioth, supra note 2, at 553.
14 Id. (citing WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE ITCHING PAIN: A STUDY OF THE HABIT OF TIPPING IN
AMERICA 38 (1916)).
15 Azar, supra note 7, at 757-58.
16 Id. at 758.
17 Margalioth, supra note 2, at 570.
18 Lynn et al., supra note 5, at 479.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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of their server’s envy, (2) reduces guilt in tippers with respect to status and
power inequalities between themselves and their server, (3) increases the social
recognition of big tippers, and (4) increases the tipper’s positive feelings about
themselves as a result of paying out extra to their server.21 While academia
suggests many rationales driving the consumer’s decision to tip, none defini-
tively explain the motivation.
A functional model for the positive role tipping plays in a business starts
with the notion that monitoring and pricing various inputs increases transaction
costs.22 Under this notion, the business can monitor and price these inputs with
greater efficiency than can consumers.23 The business’s comparative advantage
thus allows the business to obtain profit on the basis of its greater efficiencies
when it produces outputs for sale to its consumers.24 Where this notion is
extended to include service businesses, monitoring and pricing their service
worker’s input becomes more difficult and costly given the intangible nature of
the service input.25 In the context of tipping, the economic argument is that the
tipping custom is efficient in that it provides tipped workers with incentive to
do a good job even in the absence of oversight from the employer.26
While doing well to demonstrate that tipping is an established custom in
the United States, and suggesting many reasons why consumers may tip, the
available academic literature falls short of suggesting how one may impute a
consumer’s intent to bestow a tip, and to whom that consumer intended the
bestowment. Subsection ‘A’ will illuminate issues relating to the consumer’s
intent to bestow. Then Subsection ‘B’ will analyze the alternative to the tipping
custom: “service charges,” and the role that the tip and service charge play in
price discrimination.
A. The “Qualified Bestower” and the “Bestowment Inquiry”
There are primarily two prongs to the bestowment inquiry.27 First, who is
qualified to bestow? Second, how does one identify that person’s intent to
bestow, and to whom that person intended the bestowment? To have a frame of
reference as to the term “bestow,” one need only turn to Merriam-Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary, which defines “bestow” as “to convey as a gift—usu-
ally used with on or upon.”28 As to the first inquiry, an ordinary understanding
of the context of tipping is available to anyone who has sat at a restaurant table
and ordered food and beverage from a waiter. The waiter brings a course or
perhaps several courses of food, and perhaps beverages. You are the diner, and
21 Michael Lynn & Glenn Withiam, Tipping and its Alternatives: Business Considerations
and Directions for Research, 22 J. SERVICES MARKETING 328, 329 (2008).
22 Lynn et al., supra note 5, at 479.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 The “bestowment inquiry” is a term and analytical framework I have developed for this
paper.
28 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, http://mw2.merriam-webster.com/dictionary.bestow
(emphasis in original). This appears to be a common usage as Black’s Law Dictionary simi-
larly defines the terms “[t]o convey as a gift <bestow an honor on another>.” Black’s Law
Dictionary, 182 (9th ed. 2009).
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by virtue of your experience during the service of your meal, you are a quali-
fied bestower.
As to the second part of the bestowment inquiry (how and to whom we
may identify the qualified bestower’s intent to bestow), the example continues.
After you have finished (and hopefully enjoyed) your meal, you receive a cor-
responding check (assume it costs $100). You then consider how much you are
going to leave in addition to that amount in the form of a tip. Maybe you will
leave 20%, maybe 15%, or perhaps nothing at all. The point is that the typical
diner will bestow a tip, regardless of the amount they actually bestow, even if
that amount is zero. Therefore, the “tip” may be defined as the monetary mani-
festation of your sentiment as the qualified bestower with respect to your expe-
rience. In this context, your experience was your meal.
In Moen v. Las Vegas International Hotel, Judge Thompson developed a
“line of service” theory in order to impute intent to bestow.29 He argued that
the mere fact that the last person in the line of service receives the tip is not
sufficient to suppose that person is “the only one entitled to share in the cus-
tomer’s bounty.”30 In our example, that last person is the waiter who brings the
check at the end of your meal. For illustration, return to the example. You are
the diner with the $100 check in your hand and are weighing how much you
want to leave as a tip. Here is where contemplation of the line of service theory
manifests itself. You will likely have a percentage of the bill you normally tip
as a ceiling percentage. Let us assume that number is 20% of the gross amount
on the check.
You will likely consider how your reservation was handled. Further influ-
encing your decision is how you subsequently were handled by several employ-
ees in the line of service: the hostess who takes you to your table; whether the
waiter was knowledgeable about the various menus, i.e., appetizer, main
course, dessert and wine menus; and whether the busser cleared plates and
brought water and coffee refills in a timely and un-intrusive manner. Additional
factors, which may operate to influence your decision include: bill size, server
friendliness, server attractiveness, your gender, dining-party size, frequency of
your patronage, and payment method.31 On the balance of these and other con-
siderations, you will bestow your tip as against your ceiling percentage.
The Moen line of service theory suggests the importance of the fact that
more than one classification of employee played a role in your bestowment
determination.32 In so doing, Moen assumes the tip is bestowed upon the ser-
vice, rather than the server. Nevertheless, this assumption ignores the fact that
you, the qualified bestower, are not the only person measuring the service you
received. In so doing, the assumption ignores a prevalent “usage of trade.”33 In
29 Moen v. Las Vegas Int’l Hotel, Inc., 402 F. Supp 157, 160 (D. Nev. 1975), aff’d, 554
F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977).
30 Id.
31 Lynn et al., supra note 5, at 479-80.
32 Of course this begs the question of how far the line of service should extend. Does it
include the doorman who greeted you at the entrance? The dishwasher, cleaning crew, or
architect of the restaurant? All of these people arguably played some role in your experience.
Yet intuitively, this is a grossly attenuated suggestion.
33 I borrow from U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2004) for this term which states: “A ‘usage of trade’ is
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation,
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our example, the trade usage Moen ignores is the customary right a primarily-
tipped worker has most often had to determine how to distribute the primary
gratuity to the secondarily-tipped employee.34 The person whose name is on
the check, and almost without exception it is your waiter’s name, will also
measure the service you received when he or she decides how in turn to bestow
gratuity to the other employees in the line of service.35
This argument is supported by the functional model of the increased trans-
action cost associated with efficient employer monitoring and pricing of the
service inputs.36 Because the qualified bestower is in a superior position to
observe the quality of service as against the employer, or even the supervisor,
the optimal transaction between the qualified bestower and the primarily-tipped
employee would be a written service contract.37 However, repeating such a
contract with each qualified bestower on each visit would produce prohibitive
transaction costs.38 For this reason, the norm of restaurant tipping may be
viewed as an efficient substitution.39
From the functional model just discussed, we may reason by analogy that
the primarily-tipped employee may likewise be in a superior position to moni-
tor and price the quality of service they are receiving from the secondarily-
tipped staff than is the employer or supervisor. Consider again our example,
only with slightly changed facts. As you are having your meal, your water
remains empty. You ordered coffee, but it has arrived twenty minutes after you
ordered it, and ten minutes after you have finished the dessert you meant to
enjoy with the coffee. Moreover, after you finish the first cup of coffee you
have finally received, no refill is forthcoming. You look around. Your waiter is
obviously busy. In fact, you have seen her at one table or another, taking
orders, placing silverware, and putting orders in the computer. Clearly, she is
busy and doing everything she can to keep up with the flow of business. But
where is the busser? Does she have one? The truth is she may be asking herself
the same question. Upset at the slow service you have received, assume that not
only do you choose to bestow no tip at all, but later you call to complain to the
manager. You have retained your receipt. The name on it is that of your waiter.
That is the name you give the manager. Who do you think will be held respon-
sible once management subsequently handles your complaint with its
employees?
or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question.”
34 Admittedly, this assertion comes from my own experience in the restaurant business.
Without exception, as a waiter I have never been deprived of the right to determine how
much and to whom I would tip among the secondarily-tipped staff.
35 For the purposes of this paper, I shall call those other employees the “secondarily-tipped
staff.” By extension, I will generally refer to waiters, bartenders, cocktail servers, and table
games dealers as “primarily-tipped staff.” Said differently, I employ the term “primarily-
tipped staff” where it accurately refers to Moen’s notion of the last person in the line of
service who receives the primary tip, which is then subsequently divided among the seconda-
rily-tipped staff.
36 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
37 Michael Conlin et al., The Norm of Restaurant Tipping, 52 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 297,
305 (2003).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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It is this primary responsibility for your experience that waiters are willing
to assume, because with greater responsibility comes a greater share of the cut,
and customarily, the primary right to determine how and to whom the remain-
ing portion of the gratuities will be divided among the secondarily-tipped staff.
However, while research suggests that there may be elements of efficiency in
the tipping custom, it further suggests that the custom is not fully efficient.40
Therefore, this cannot conclusively explain why restaurants, hotels and others
support tip implementation.
The degree to which the average consumer engages in menu price discrim-
ination may also explain why an employer supports tip implementation. For the
rational consumer, the addition of the tip to the menu price should cause them
to view the price of their meal not merely in terms of the menu price, but in
terms of the aggregate price of their meal. In turn, a firm should be able to
increase the menu price while discouraging the rational consumer from tipping.
In this way, they would be able to increase revenues directly. As a result, they
would not feel the need to extract economic rent41 from their tipped employees
either by taking the tips directly, or by reducing their tipped-employees’ wages
to compensate for the tipped-income. However, as the next section will ana-
lyze, in addition to the functional model, the reason firms may prefer to imple-
ment tipping may be the bounded rationality42 of their consumers. This is
because those consumers may react differently to increased menu prices as
compared to the additional tip expectation over the otherwise lower menu price.
B. Considering the Alternative: the “Service Charge” and Price
Discrimination
For the purpose of this Note, the service charge may be understood as a
flat fee, which a firm will either charge per consumer or as a percentage of
listed menu prices. This is readily distinguishable from the tipping custom in
that, unlike the tip, the service charge is a compulsory charge the firm makes
upon the consumer. In further distinguishing the service charge from the tip,
one must consider the distinction between nominal and real pricing. Nominal
prices constitute only a part of the bill.43 For example, the price of a rib-eye
steak on a restaurant menu would constitute the nominal price. Whereas the
real price includes the nominal price plus any additional surcharges such as tax,
the service charge, and the tip.44
When comparing the relative expenses of competing services, consumers
may focus on the nominal rather than real prices.45 The easier the information
available to consumers is to use in this comparison, the more likely they are to
40 Id. at 298.
41
“Economic rent” is a term economists use to define one aspect of the price of goods and
services. Generally, it represents the difference between total revenues, and total costs. RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (7th ed.).
42
“Bounded rationality” is an economic term of art which refers to the fact that consumers
operate with inherent cognitive limitations. Thus, a consumer may have a limited ability to
understand information about the product or service they are purchasing. Id. at 393.
43 Lynn & Withiam, supra note 21, at 329.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 330.
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apply it in their decision.46 Because nominal prices are explicitly stated, they
are generally more accessible to the consumer.47 One study specifically sug-
gests that nominal prices influence subjective comparisons of expensiveness
even after the consumer has adjusted for the additional surcharges.48 The rea-
son the firm may prefer the tip to the service charge is that tipping as a form of
price discrimination features two key aspects. First, the tip offers a voluntary
form of consumer price differential.49 As against the price-insensitive con-
sumer,50 the price-sensitive consumer is more likely to avoid paying a price
premium by tipping less than the norm.51 Second, while the firm does not
directly receive revenues from tips as they would in charging premiums to
price-insensitive consumers for other products, they do receive the indirect
benefit of the tip in the form of lower labor costs.52 Therefore, the price dis-
crimination that tipping provides may translate to increased sales and profits to
the extent that price-sensitive consumers are filling otherwise empty seats.53
On the other hand, where the firms add a service charge, they are able to
control directly the distribution of that revenue. This allows them not only to
distribute those funds to the workers who would customarily receive tips, but
also to those who customarily would not. The use of the service charge may
allow the firm to raise the average wage rate of its labor force, thus contributing
to lower turnover rates and increased competitiveness in recruiting new
employees.
To illustrate the challenges of service charge implementation, entertain the
following hypothetical. Assume you are in a very busy Las Vegas nightclub.
The music is so loud that you have to yell at your companions to be heard, so
you text them instead. You want to purchase four “rum & Coke” cocktails, but
you have to wade through several layers of revelers before you can even get to
the bar. Then it takes you another several minutes to get the bartender’s atten-
tion. When he finally acknowledges you, you yell your order to him: “FOUR
RUM & COKES!” He returns with your cocktails and yells back to you,
“THAT WILL BE $40.” Assume you pay cash. When you hand over your
payment, you give the bartender $50 and tell him to keep the change. Do you
ask for your receipt? Moreover, do you look to see if the cost included a service
charge? If it indeed included a 2% service charge, would you take your tip
back? What if the service charge was 20%? Would you wade back through the
masses to take your tip back then?
Now change the facts. You are sitting in an upscale restaurant with one
other dining companion. At the end of your meal, your waiter brings you your
check. As you relax over your final sips of exquisite espresso, you notice a
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 331.
50 Price insensitivity is a referent to the price a consumer is willing to pay for a good or
service. Theoretically, price-insensitivity will increase with higher levels of income as
against the price-sensitive consumer. Id.
51 Id. Recall that the norm in the U.S. as of 2007 is 19%. See supra text accompanying note
17.
52 Lynn & Withiam, supra note 21, at 331 (emphasis added).
53 Id.
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service charge is included. Assume the cost of the meal was $200. Would the
fact that the service charge is 2% affect the way you tip your server? What if
the service charge was 20%?
In the nightclub hypothetical, the transaction costs of retrieving the tip in
light of the service charge revelation are likely prohibitive to the extent that
going back to get the tip is not worth the tip you left. However, in the more
relaxed environment of the upscale restaurant, the transaction costs are much
lower. Your consideration of the service charge and how it will impact your
decision to tip may now be made at the comfort of your own table. Indeed the
nightclub versus restaurant distinction plays out on the Las Vegas Strip every
night.54
In the context of the casino and gaming industry, the service charge sim-
ply seems inapplicable. Casinos derive their profit from the consumer’s gaming
losses. To tack on a service charge, the casino would essentially have to tax a
gambler for playing. For this reason, a casino cannot contemplate the service
charge and hope to remain competitive against those who do not. Thus, if the
casino seeks to extract rent from the tip in order to pay out its other non-tradi-
tionally tipped employees, it must do so by taking the tip directly from the table
games dealers to whom the tip is otherwise bestowed.
In summary-against the service charge-the tip features advantages to the
firm because it is consistent with established social norms, it may serve as an
efficient monitoring and pricing device, and it offers the price-sensitive con-
sumer a greater degree of control in price discrimination. In contrast, the auto-
matic service charge offers firms direct control over the distribution of the rents
that tipped-workers normally derive from their tips. This in turn may raise the
average income of the workers, thus contributing to long-term stability and
increased competitiveness in recruitment. However, consumers may resent add-
on service charges to their bill, especially where the nature of those charges are
not fully articulated in advance. Moreover, in the context of gaming, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a casino could add a service charge on a hand of blackjack
and yet remain competitive.
III. A MODEL THEORY OF THE TIPPING CUSTOM UNDER PROPERTY AND
CONTRACT LAW
A useful way to consider the rights of parties with respect to the tip is
represented in what shall be called the “Nexus of the Tip” model (see Figure 1).
54 For example, at the nightclub Mix in Las Vegas at Mandalay Bay, the cost of reserving a
table requires that for every four guests seated at a table, a bottle of alcohol must be pur-
chased. Basic bottles such as a 750 ml of Grey Goose vodka can start at $350. A 20% service
charge is included. However, under the Culinary Union’s collective bargaining agreement
affecting virtually every major casino on the Strip, a compulsory tip is not included in restau-
rants unless the party size is for eight or more guests. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment between Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino & Local Joint Executive Board of Las
Vegas 2007-2012, at 7 (2007) (Art. 5.02: Gratuities states, “A gratuity shall be added to
checks for parties of eight (8) or more in all full service restaurants for guests paying with
cash or credit card.”) [hereinafter Mandalay Bay Contract].
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FIGURE 1
The model begins with the qualified bestower’s (“QB”) relationship to the
tip as against the primarily-tipped employee, the secondarily-tipped employee,
and the employer (collectively: “the house”). Both the primarily and seconda-
rily-tipped employees have a direct relationship to the QB, because he may
hand either one of them the money directly. In contrast, the employer has only
an indirect relationship to the QB by virtue of its contractual relationship to its
tipped employees.
To illustrate this relationship, consider the following hypothetical. The QB
has just finished his meal in a full-service restaurant. The server brings him his
check in a check-presenter.55 He opens the check-presenter and sees the check.
It is in the amount of $100. He takes one $100 bill and one $20 bill out of his
wallet, places it in the check-presenter, and hands it back to the server. The
server takes the check-presenter along with its contents to a cash register, puts
the cash amount of the check, $100, into the register, and then changes the
remaining $20 bill into one $10 bill and two $5 bills. The server returns with
the change in the check presenter, and hands it back to the QB. The QB then
opens the check-presenter, and removes one $5 bill. He then puts the $5 bill in
his pocket and leaves the remaining amount, $15, in the check-presenter, which
he then closes. As he gets up from his table, he hands his server the check-
presenter, thanks the server and walks out of the restaurant. At what point does
his property interest in the money he left in the check-presenter transfer to the
house? Specifically, at what point in the exchange can the house assert a supe-
rior property interest in the cash as against the qualified bestower?
Now add one more fact to this scenario. On the way out, the QB sees the
busser who was working with his waiter, and hands him the remaining $5 bill.
Does the fact that this action, which takes place away from the point of sale,
somehow operate to exclude all others from asserting a superior property inter-
est in the $5 bill as against the busser? Said differently, above the $15 left on
55 Within the restaurant industry, “check presenter” is a term of art. “Check presenters”
would be familiar to anyone who has been presented the “check” or bill for their meal inside,
or on top of any object that is used specifically for that purpose.
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the table, does the side-tip, which is clearly aimed at an individual, require a
different analysis?
A. The Bestowment Inquiry and the Relative Property Rights of the Parties
at the Nexus of the Tip
FIGURE 2
Figure 2 represents the point in the transaction that the QB maintains the
superior property right in the money he left in the check-presenter. Once the tip
has passed through the bottom line of the “Bestowment Inquiry & Property
Rights” triangle and enters the “Contract Rights to The Bestowment” triangle,
the QB has forfeited his superior property interest in the tip as against the
house. This is represented in Figure 3.
This relationship also attaches to the “side-tip” the QB offers the busser on
his way out. Intuitively we know that at some point the property interest trans-
fers. However, regardless of the pressure the social norm of the tipping custom
may exert on the QB, this transfer is entirely voluntary. In order to ascertain
when the property right has transferred, the first step is to characterize properly
the QB’s interest in the bestowment as a property interest.
FIGURE 3
The money the QB will use to manifest his sentiment above his contrac-
tual obligations with respect to his experience contains all of the sticks associ-
ated with his bundle of rights in property.56 So long as he does not violate
public policy, he has the right to possess and use his money any way he
56 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (referring to the “bun-
dle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”).
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wants,57 regardless of whether he spends it on a menu item, or whether he
bestows it as a tip. After reviewing the menu and thus having reasonable notice
of the price for the items, he then orders and consumes those items. In this
sense, he has accepted the employer’s offer to enter into a contract to consume
food and beverage at a stated price in exchange for his payment of money in
return. In contrast, after reviewing the check he receives at the end of his meal,
he voluntarily transfers his money through the bestowment of the tip, likely as
a percentage of the nominal price. Rather than an obligation arising from his
contractual agreement, his bestowment arises from his sense of obligation
under a social norm—the tipping custom. His is the right to transfer that
money to whomever he wants. As well, it is his right to exclude from the
bestowment whomever he wants.
The difficulty in determining to whom the QB intends the bestowment
remains. If the transaction costs were not so high, the employer could interro-
gate the QB as to whom he intended the bestowment. However, the transaction
costs are high and may be characterized in at least three ways. First, interrogat-
ing a QB over just what they meant to do in their moment of gratuitous behav-
ior may operate to persuade them not to return for this insult a second time.58
Second, the employer may be told that the intended recipient is whoever the
primarily-tipped employee wants it to be, thus excluding the employer from
preempting the primarily-tipped employee’s discretion in the tip-out. Finally,
because monitoring every QB, so as to know when they are finished making
their determination, would incur opportunity costs where the operation of the
business requires the interrogator to engage in other aspects of the business.
Having properly characterized the QB’s interest in the bestowment as a
property interest, while at the same time not having his specific instruction as to
whom and in what amounts he intended the bestowment, the second step
requires that we characterize his intent under property law with greater
precision.
In the following two sections, the analysis will first contemplate the prop-
erty rights relative to the gratuity assuming the QB intends to tip the primarily-
tipped employee. Then the analysis will contemplate these rights assuming the
QB intends to tip the service and all those who played a role in delivering it. In
order to properly characterize the QB’s intent in either circumstance, the analy-
sis turns on donative intent. Therefore, the analysis begins with contemplation
of the relationship between gifting, exchange and conversion.
57 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (stating that “[p]roperty rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”). As an inherently limited
proposition, property rights exist to the extent they serve a socially acceptable justification.
JOHN G. SPALDING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4 (2d ed. 2007).
58 This behavior is expressly prohibited by some employers. See Mandalay Bay New Hire
Orientation (Rule of Conduct #26 states that this is a form of hustling tips, and that the
associated discipline may include termination for a first time offense).
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1. From the Primarily-Tipped Employee’s Perspective: Whether the
Bestowment is a Gift or an Exchange; and Whether the
Employer’s Preemption of the Primarily-Tipped Employee’s
Discretion of How Much and to Whom to Secondarily
Tip Constitutes Conversion
There are essentially two issues this section addresses. First, has the QB
exhibited donative intent to a particular employee when bestowing the tip? Sec-
ond, if so, can the QB fully transfer his superior property right to that person as
against any property right the employer may assert in the tip? After first dis-
cussing the elements of a proper gift inter vivos, the analysis will deconstruct
the notion of the “gift” to demonstrate why there is no pure gift in the context
of the bestowment, and that while distinguishable, donative transfers are in fact
inseparable from exchange relationships. Finally, the analysis will overlay
these considerations with whether employers engage in fraudulent behavior, as
embodied in the image of the Trojan horse, so as to induce conversion of the
QB’s bestowment to the employee.
The common law specifies three requirements for a valid gift inter vivos:
(1) intent (the donor must intend to make an immediate gift); (2) delivery (the
donor must deliver the gift); and (3) acceptance (the donee must accept the
gift).59 In the example in which the QB leaves the $15 tip in the check-pre-
senter while taking back the $5 bill, we may impute his intent to make the gift.
Then, when he gets up from the table and hands the check-presenter to his
server, he has actually delivered the gift. Finally, the server accepts the check-
presenter (and the cash in it) as the QB walks out the door of the restaurant.
From these facts alone, we may say that the QB’s rights in the tip have become
inferior to those of the server. At this point, the server may reasonably rely on
the fact that the QB has left that property and has no intent to return for it. We
may also apply this analysis to the side-tip the QB bestows on the busser. He
took back the $5 bill from the change his server brought him and put it in his
pocket. He handed the $5 bill to the busser only after leaving his table. To the
reasonable person, this action would demonstrate his intent to bestow a separate
amount to the busser from that which he left in the check presenter on the table.
The act of taking the $5 from his pocket and then handing it to the busser is
actual delivery. Finally, when the busser accepts the $5 bill, the transfer of the
property interest is complete.
However, the issue of whether the tip may be characterized as a “gift”
requires further analysis. This analysis begins by distinguishing a gift as against
an “exchange.” While a gift may be characterized as a voluntary unilateral
transfer of a property right, an exchange may be characterized as a voluntary
reciprocal transfer of respective property rights.60 There is one more transfer
that need be explored: conversion. Conversion is an intentional exercise of con-
trol over property, which so seriously interferes with the right of another to
59 Schmanski v. Schmanski, 984 P.2d 752, 756 (Nev. 1999) (citing 38 AM. JUR. 2d Gifts
§ 17 (1999)).
60 Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. R. 295, 296 (1992).
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control it, that the person whose right was interfered with may seek damages.61
Said differently, conversion is the involuntary unilateral transfer on the part of
the donor.62 Consider this relationship in the form of the following diagram:
FIGURE 4
Each of the three categories is related to the others in the sense that they
are all transfers. To the extent that each category is present in a transaction,
each will overlap with the others. For example, we may characterize the
bestowment of the tip as a gift because it is a voluntary unilateral transfer from
the QB to the primarily-tipped employee. This is because it operates indepen-
dent of the nominal pricing contractual relationship established between the QB
and the employer by virtue of their exchange. Moreover, the bestowment typi-
cally occurs when the meal is over and the check is presented. Recall that when
the QB makes the bestowment, his action defies explanation under traditional
models of economic exchange. This is because while through bestowment the
QB acts in his own self-interest with respect to the pressure the social norm of
tipping creates, it remains unclear what he receives in return. However, by vir-
tue of the fact that the QB acts in his own self-interest, his “gift” bleeds over
into the category of exchange, even if only ever so slightly.
How conversion enters the mix may best be understood through the earlier
discussion of the “service charge.”63 Recall that there are several reasons the
firm may prefer the tip to the service charge: (1) tipping is a superior form of
price discrimination; (2) tipping is consistent with social norms; and (3) the
person being served is in a superior position as against the employer to price
and value the service he receives.64 However, because tipping is a direct pay-
ment to the employee, the employer loses at least some discretion in how the
tip is distributed secondarily. In the absence of a statute or contract preventing
it from doing so, the employer may compensate for this by requiring its
employees to turn over their tips to the employer. Nevertheless, they may still
incur losses where the tips are made in cash rather than credit card transactions
due to theft of the cash tips by employees.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965).
62 Rose, supra note 60, at 297.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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Alternatively, when employers add a service charge, they are directly able
to control the distribution of the economic rents65 tips would otherwise pro-
duce. This in turn allows them to raise the average wage rate of their labor
force, thus contributing to both lower turnover rates, and increased competitive-
ness in recruitment. Unfortunately, this may also make them less competitive in
the price-sensitive consumer market.66 Instead, they abandon the service charge
in favor of allowing the QB to engage in the tipping custom for the reasons
described above. They can then convert the bestowment into the essence of a
service charge.67 So, a fourth reason employers would prefer the tip is such that
they may indirectly control the distribution of that revenue. As a direct result of
this conversion, the employer has yet again attained direct control of the distri-
bution of the revenue, even if it has used an indirect method to do so. As long
as there is no statutory or contractual provision that prevents it from doing so,
the employer may hide in the belly of the Trojan horse that is the primarily-
tipped employee, and wait for the QB to open the gates to their property inter-
est in the money they will unwittingly bestow to the employer. Through this
discussion, we may now add some texture to the diagram below:
FIGURE 5
Conversion has its analogue under criminal law: larceny. Perhaps Profes-
sor Rose said it best:
[Among other things], it includes those trickster “Greeks bearing gifts,” along with
modern con artists who always seem to be giving away something for nothing. The
old common law name for that kind of thing was “larceny by trick;” even though I
may use the image of giving you something, I am really trying to get something from
you, against what would be your will if you had better sense . . . .68
In Nevada, a person commits larceny by taking the property he intends to
deprive its owner of possession, even if that person’s intent does not include
65 See supra note 41.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 43-53.
67 Recall that a “service charge” may be understood as a flat fee, which a firm will either
charge per consumer or as a percentage of listed menu prices. See the discussion of the
“service charge” beginning supra, p. 10.
68 Rose, supra note 60, at 297 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW 627 (1972)).
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possession of the property for his own benefit.69 Though an employer may
argue that he is taking the tip not for his benefit but for that of his employees,
then under this definition, he may nevertheless be guilty of larceny not only
against the primarily-tipped employee, but more importantly, against the QB.
While this may seem like a wild proposition, we need only look at the develop-
ment of Nevada’s statutory law concerning the tipping custom for support.
As far back as 1939, the Nevada legislature passed an act speaking to
employers’ actions in this regard.70 At that time, Chapter 17 of the Statutes of
Nevada stated in its preamble that because employers were as a matter of prac-
tice taking portions of any tips bestowed upon their employees, the legislature
viewed this practice as “tend[ing] to perpetrate a fraud or imposition upon the
public.”71 Moreover, the legislature viewed this as a direct result of “the
employers’ failure to notify the public that tips bestowed upon employees go to
the employers.”72 Thus, the employer would have to post notice of its practice
in a place easily seen by the public.73 Conviction under this statute would result
in a misdemeanor.74
The 1939 statute spoke to two employer actions that would trigger its
notice to the public requirement. The first was where “[any] person who takes
all or any part of any tips or gratuities bestowed upon his employees,” and the
second was where “[any person] who credits the same toward payment of his
employees’ wages.”75 In 1971, the Nevada legislature amended this statute to
read:
1) It is unlawful for any person to:
a) Take all or part of any tips or gratuities bestowed upon the employees of that
person.
b) Apply as a credit toward the payment of the statutory minimum hourly wage
established by any law of this State any tips or gratuities bestowed upon the
employees of that person.
2) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent such employees
from entering into an agreement to divide such tips or gratuities.76
Moen v. Las Vegas International Hotel77 was the first case to apply the
1971 amendment. The plaintiff in that case was a casino table games dealer
who contended that under the statute, employers were precluded from requiring
69 State v. Slingerland, 7 P. 280, 280 (Nev. 1885).
70 1939 Statutes of Nev. p. 13, quoted in Moen v. Las Vegas Int’l Hotel, 402 F. Supp. 157,
158-59 (1975).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 159.
73 Id.
74 The sentencing guidelines in the 1939 statute called for “a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail
not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or by [both].” Id. In 2009 dollars, the fine
would be between $1,500 and $7,500. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
75 Formerly section 1 of chapter 17 of Laws 1939, amended by 1971 Nev. Stat. p. 1263,
codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 (1971).
76 NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 (1973); subsection 1(b) was the product of amendment by
S.B. 536, 1973 Leg., 57th Sess. (Nev. 1973) (amending NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160(1)(b) to
limit scope of provision barring application of tips to the state minimum wage law).
77 402 F. Supp 157 (D. Nev. 1975).
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their primarily-tipped employees to share their tips, or “tip-pool,” with other
employees including other dealers, boxmen, casino cashiers and floormen.78
Notwithstanding the fact that the preamble was deleted in 1971, the court found
that when construing the 1971 amendment, one should “bear[ ] in mind the
preamble to the 1939 statute.”79 On this basis, the court concluded that the
notice requirement under the 1939 statute was “insufficient and that adequate
protection of the public against the presumed fraud involved in a taking of
tips . . . could not be obtained without an express prohibition of such prac-
tices.”80 Indeed the 1971 amendment’s legislative history supports this conclu-
sion. The Nevada Labor Commissioner’s representative to the hearings before
the Assembly Labor and Management Committee stated that the Commis-
sioner’s office was having “difficulty enforcing the posting of the Notice
required by present law.”81
Moen became the seminal case in that its analysis was adopted by the
Nevada Supreme Court,82 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,83 and most
recently Nevada’s Labor Commissioner.84 Curiously, none of these opinions
cite Moen for its premise that the legislative intent driving the 1971 amendment
was for the protection of the unwary public against the presumed fraud
involved when the employer takes the tips they bestow upon the primarily-
tipped employee. If, as these courts have suggested, the Moen interpretation of
the statute is correct, and must be given serious consideration, why then have
those courts omitted the Moen premise from each of their opinions? At first,
one might conclude that the rationale of Moen is internally inconsistent, and
thus in conflict with itself.
It is only when we turn to the Moen analysis of the tipped-employee’s
property right in the tip that this apparent inconsistency may be recognized as
congruent after all. As discussed above, the “gift” of the tip bestowment is
fairly characterized as an exchange, and therefore understood through the same
element that makes the exchange transfer understandable: self-interest.85 The
self-interest in the bestowment extends to each party in the Nexus of the Tip
model. For the tipped employees, that self-interest is embodied in their desire to
control directly any secondary distribution of the tip they receive, to the extent
they personally feel compelled to tip at all. The employer’s self-interest stems
from the desire to control directly the allocation of the tip, while taking advan-
78 Id. at 158.
79 Id. at 159.
80 Id. at 160.
81 Hearing on A.B.353 Before the Labor and Mgmt. Comm., 1971 Leg., 56th Sess. 11
(1971) (statement of Stan Jones, Rep., Nev. State Labor Comm’n) [hereinafter Hearing].
82 Alford v. Harolds Club, 669 P.2d 721, 724 (Nev. 1983) (stating “[W]e believe that the
interpretation advanced in Moen is, in light of the legislative history and well established and
commonly known Nevada employment practices, the correct one.”); see also Baldonado v.
Wynn, 194 P.3d 96, 102 (Nev. 2008).
83 Cotter v. Desert Palace, 880 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Alford, 669 P.2d at
721; Moen, 402 F. Supp. at 157).
84 Baldonado v. Wynn, Nev. Labor Comm’r 7 (July 2010) (stating that Moen is the “semi-
nal case” and that its “analysis must be given serious consideration.”) [hereinafter Labor
Comm’r].
85 Rose, supra note 60, at 300.
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tage of the indirect relationship they have to the tip by virtue of the tipping
custom. One cannot disregard the fact that, but for the business the employer
has created, the tipped employee would not have the context in which to benefit
from the tipping custom at all.
Moreover, the employer may fairly argue that its self-interest is character-
ized as a desire to have the ability to run its business and in that regard have the
ability to include within the pool those who probably have the least leverage. It
is this tension between the tipped employees and the employer that ultimately
led to the apparent inconsistency in the Moen analysis. That is, the tension in
the struggle for control of the tip swallowed whole the argument that concern
for sufficient protection of the public against any presumed fraud involved in
the taking of tips drove the legislative intent behind the 1971 amendment.
However, as the next section reveals, Moen created a trust relationship under
state law. It is through the trust lens that one may finally view the Moen ratio-
nale as internally congruent.
2. From the Employer’s Perspective: Whether the Qualified Bestower
Intends to Tip the Service Rather than the Server, and Therefore
Bestows Trustee Status upon the Employer
Since 1971, there have been several attempts to amend NRS § 608.160.86
All but one failed.87 The essential struggle has been over two issues. One issue
revolves around whether the employer should be allowed to apply the tip as a
credit against the minimum wage.88 The other issue is whether the employer or
the primarily-tipped employee should have the express right to determine how
the tips will be allocated amongst the secondarily-tipped staff.89 Despite these
efforts, NRS § 608.160 has remained substantively unchanged since its incep-
tion in 1971.
86 S.B. 536, 1973 Leg., 57th  Sess. (Nev. 1973) (amending NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 608.160(1)(b) to limit scope of provision barring application of tips to the state minimum
wage law); S.B. 307, 1983 Leg., 62nd  Sess. (Nev. 1983) (attempted amendment of NEV.
REV. STAT. § 608.160 by declaring tips to be gifts and prohibiting certain deductions from
wages); S.B. 549, 1993 Leg., 67th Sess. (Nev. 1993) (attempted amendment of NEV. REV.
STAT. § 608.160 by providing credit for tips against minimum wage); A.B. 701, 1993 Leg.,
67th Sess. (Nev. 1993) (attempted amendment of NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 by prohibiting
the employer from applying any tips bestowed an employee as credit against wages to any
employee); A.B. 284, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995) (attempted amendment to NEV.
REV. STAT. § 608.160 by prohibiting the employer from requiring the employee to share tips
with certain other employees); A.B. 357, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. (Nev. 2007) (attempted
amendment of NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 by revising provisions governing tips and gratui-
ties received by employees).
87 S.B. 536, 1973 Leg., 57th Sess. (Nev. 1973) (amending NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160(1)(b)
to limit scope of provision barring application of tips to the state minimum wage law).
88 NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160(1)(b) (1973) currently provides that it is unlawful for
employers to “[a]pply as a credit toward the payment of the statutory minimum hourly wage
established by any law of [the state of Nevada] any tips or gratuities bestowed upon [their]
employees.”
89 See A.B. 284, 1995 Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995) (attempted amendment to NEV. REV.
STAT. § 608.160 by prohibiting the employer from requiring the employee to share tips with
certain other employees); A.B. 357, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. (Nev. 2007) (attempted amend-
ment of NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 by revising provisions governing tips and gratuities
received by employees).
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In 1971, during hearings before the Labor and Management Committee,
several opponents to the bill stated that they wanted to amend it so that the
employer could not compel employees to share their tips.90 However, members
of the committee responded that the requested amendments would be over-
stepping into the field of management.91 Though the Moen analysis did not cite
this exchange in its rationale, it was likely a motivating factor for its ultimate
conclusion: “the disposition of tips is properly a matter for contractual determi-
nation between the employer and employee.”92 In reaching this conclusion, the
Moen court reasoned that given the tip-pooling language in § 608.160(2), an
employer does not “take” tips within the meaning of the statute “so long as only
employees share in the tips.”93
Moen suggests that the tip-pooling language has two possible readings.94
On the one hand, it could be read as: “Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to prevent such employees from entering into an agreement with
other employees to divide such tips . . . among themselves.”95 On the other
hand, it could be read as: “Nothing contained in this section shall be construed
to prevent such employees from entering into an agreement with the employer
or with other employees to divide such tips . . . among the employees.”96 Moen
adopted the latter and broader reading of the two.97
At first glance, this broader reading appears to be inconsistent with the
court’s statement early in the opinion that when construing the 1971 amend-
ment, one should bear in mind the 1939 preamble of the predecessor statute to
NRS § 608.160.98 However, whether the broader reading is inconsistent
depends on how one characterizes the term “take” within the meaning of the
statute.
On the one hand, if “take” is construed to mean anything that directly or
indirectly benefits the employer, then certainly the Moen interpretation is
inconsistent. This is because if the statute was meant to protect “the public
against the presumed fraud involved in a taking of tips,”99 then even the indi-
rect benefits an employer gains by allocating the tips to those that might have
made less could be construed as a taking.
On the other hand, if “take” is construed to mean that the employer only
uses the tips for its direct benefit, then the Moen interpretation is consistent.
This depends on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the notion of a
direct benefit must be narrowly construed so that only “where the employer
actually pockets and retains the tips to the exclusion of its employees, such an
90 A.B. 353, 1971 Leg., 56th Sess., at 10 (Nev. 1971).
91 Id. at 11.
92 Moen v. Las Vegas Int’l Hotel, 402 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Nev. 1975).
93 Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
94 That language is in NEV. REV. STAT. 608.160(2) and reads: “Nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to prevent such employees from entering into an agreement to
divide such tips or gratuities.”
95 Moen, 402 F. Supp. at 160 (emphasis added).
96 Id. (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 162.
98 See supra text accompanying footnotes 80-82.
99 Moen, 402 F. Supp. at 160.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG109.txt unknown Seq: 20  6-JUN-12 11:29
148 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:129
action can clearly be identified as a taking.”100 Certainly, opponents to the
“direct only” construction would argue that this is a mere form over substance
argument. NRS § 608.160 does not mention the term ‘benefit’ anywhere in its
language. For this reason, there is no meaningful distinction between a direct or
indirect benefit. Therefore, opponents to the Moen rationale would conclude
that an employer’s use of employee tips for its own benefit is nevertheless in
violation of the statute.101
In a hearing before the Nevada’s Assembly Committee on Judiciary,
Andrew Pascal, President of Wynn Las Vegas (“Wynn”), stated that the casino
sought to address issues that had arisen with respect to its table games opera-
tion, and that to do this, it decided to reallocate the tip distribution.102 Of the
issues it sought to address, the most important were to: (1) get those employees
“who work closest to customers to take responsibility for the customer’s expe-
rience;” (2) “[get people working] in the pits to show more motivation in work-
ing side by side with the dealers;” and (3) get the “pit managers [to] take a
more active role in influencing [their] guests’ overall experience.”103 Note that
the primary concerns voiced by Mr. Pascal were related to issues that affected
the company’s relationship with customer experience. Those issues, in the
employer’s opinion, arose from perceived inequity in pay as between the pri-
marily-tipped employee and the employer’s supervisors and managers.104
Wynn’s reallocation of tips yielded several benefits. It likely led to an
increase in retention and recruitment rates of employees in supervisor and man-
ager positions. Moreover, the Wynn was able to improve “the quality of service
throughout [its] resorts.”105 In fact, Mr. Pascal stated that since the reallocation,
length of play in games, “overall volume of business with head counts of the
number of people that are actively playing at any given time,”106 and overall
service had improved.107 One view of these facts is that the employer was able
to do this by taking tips previously belonging to dealers, rather than increasing
its supervisors’ and managers’ pay directly from the casino’s revenue.
The second “direct benefit only” assumption is that the QB intends to tip
the service rather than the primarily-tipped employee. This is a necessary con-
dition because, if the QB intends to tip the service, then by controlling the tip
allocation the employer is acting on behalf of everyone who contributed in the
line of service. Thus, the employer is effectuating the QB’s intent that all who
contributed to the line of service have the opportunity to partake in the tip. For
example, Kim Sinatra, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Wynn Las
Vegas, testifying in the same hearing before the Assembly Committee on Judi-
ciary as Mr. Pascal, stated that “[a]s employers we want to have the ability to
run our business and include those who probably have the least leverage within
100 Labor Comm’r, supra note 85, at 16.
101 See generally Brief for Appellant at 16, Baldonado v. Wynn, 194 P.3d 96 (Nev. 2008).
102 Hearing on A.B. 357 Before the Labor & Mgmt Comm., 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. at 26
(Nev. 2007) (statement of Andrew Pascal, President of Wynn Las Vegas) [hereinafter
Pascal].
103 Id.
104 See id. at 26-27.
105 Id. at 31.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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the pool.”108 She further argued that those who have the least leverage within
the pool would likely be the ones to suffer the most because they tend to be
paid the least on a base wage level.109
Thus, under Ms. Sinatra’s rationale, the “direct only” approach to under-
standing the term “take” within the meaning of § 608.160, establishes the
employer in the role of trustee. Naturally then, the tipped employees then
become beneficiaries, which then casts the QB as the trustor under the tradi-
tional trust model. For this reason, the analysis next employs principles of trust
and agency law as lenses through which one may view the employer’s position
relative to the other parties to the Nexus of the Tip. At the heart of this inquiry
is whether the QB intends the employer or the primarily-tipped employee to act
as trustee for the benefit of the secondarily-tipped employee.
3. Under State Law the Primary Tip Gives Rise to a Trust
Under the Moen rationale, one may fairly claim that a trust relationship
arises in the line of service. First, Moen explains that prior to the 1971 amend-
ment giving rise to NRS § 608.160, the intent of the QB (the trustor in the trust
model) was to tip the line of service, and to the extent that employers were
benefiting by directly taking tips from their employees, they were violating that
intent.110 The 1971 legislature did away with the posted notice requirement111
and replaced it with the new standard that “so long as only employees share in
the tips, the statute is not violated.”112 By designating the employer as being in
the superior position to effectuate the QB’s intent to tip the line of service,
Moen effectively holds that where the employer determines the tip allocation
among its tipped employees, the employer accepts the role of the trustee, and
relegates tipped employees to the role of beneficiaries. By Ms. Sinatra’s own
terms, the employer dutifully accepts this role: “[a]s employer we want to have
the ability to . . . include those who probably have the least leverage within the
pool.”113
For an express trust to arise, the default rule is that the QB manifests intent
to create a trust relationship and subject the trustee to duties for the benefit of
one or more beneficiaries.114 In order for the trustee role to arise in either the
employer or the primarily-tipped employee, one must ascertain the point at
which the QB manifests intent that one or the other assumes the role. One way
to conceptualize this is to begin with the assumptions under Nevada state
law115 as a baseline framework, and characterize them as giving rise to the trust
relationship.
108 Hearing on A.B. 357 Before the Labor & Mgmt. Comm., 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. at 24
(Nev. 2007) (statement of Kim Sinatra, Senior Vice President and Gen. Couns., Wynn Las
Vegas) [hereinafter Sinatra].
109 Id.
110 Moen v. Las Vegas Int’l Hotel, 402 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Nev. 1975).
111 See supra text accompanying note 73.
112 Moen, 402 F. Supp. at 160.
113 Sinatra, supra note 108, at 24.
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (2003).
115 See supra text accompanying footnotes 100-110.
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Absent an employment contract to the contrary, the employer is the trus-
tee. Under the state law assumption that the QB intends to tip the service rather
than the server, the employer (as trustee) is then in the best position to allocate
that tip to all who provided the service giving rise to the tip. Likewise, under
the other state law assumption that the employer may not directly benefit from
the tip, but rather only determine its allocation, it does so as a trustee. Once the
employer accepts this role and actively allocates tips among its staff, as Wynn
has done with its dealers, the employer must accept the fiduciary duty of impar-
tiality. This duty requires the trustee to act impartially in managing and distrib-
uting the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective
interests.116 Under the basic trust, the employer (as trustee) cannot justify an
action that will exclusively benefit the primarily-tipped or secondarily-tipped
employee as beneficiaries.117 Rather, the employer must justify its decision
with respect to the aggregate welfare of both the primarily and secondarily-
tipped employees as a single class.118 Thus under Nevada state law, the over-
arching directive of the duty of impartiality prescribes the employer’s alloca-
tion of tips among its employees.119
However, a problem arises when the employer allocates a greater share of
the tip to one classification over the other. For example, an employer that allo-
cates a greater share of the tip to the primarily-tipped employee to the detriment
of the secondarily-tipped employee, does so without knowing whether the QB
(as trustor) intended this outcome. One might argue that a trustor would nor-
mally put a preference of this effect in the trust instrument. Perhaps in the
context of a restaurant, a QB could make such a preference known in the ‘tip’
line on the signed copy of the credit card slip. However, in the absence of this
specification, one might assume that the QB wanted the trustee to exercise dis-
cretion in balancing the interests of the tipped employees, favoring one over the
other depending on whether the context justified it.
The employer may justify favoring the primarily-tipped employee with a
greater tip allocation by reasoning that the primarily-tipped employee is not
only a beneficiary, but also an agent of the trust. This role may be viewed in the
following way:
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959).
117 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 651
(2004).
118 Id.
119 This duty can be varied by the terms of the trust instrument. In the union context, this is
accomplished in the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. See Section III.B infra.
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FIGURE 6
Under state law, the QB bestows the tip to the primarily-tipped employee,
and this is represented at step 1 in Figure 6. But remember that one of the two
assumptions under state law is that the QB is not tipping the last person in the
line of service, but rather the service itself. Therefore, the primarily-tipped
employee is first acting as an agent on behalf of the employer-trustee at step 2.
At this step, the primarily-tipped employee-agent transfers the tip, whether
actually or constructively, to the employer-trustee. It is a constructive transfer
where the employer has dictated the tip allocation policy, and in compliance
with that policy, the primarily-tipped employee transfers the money directly to
the designated secondarily-tipped employee-beneficiary. Step 3 represents the
transfer of the tip allocation through the employer-trustee to the employee-ben-
eficiaries, regardless of whether the employer-trustee actually or constructively
transfers the tip to the tipped employee-beneficiaries.
B. Applications: When the Trust Beneficiaries Displace the State Law Trust
Approach in Favor of Contracts—the Effect of the Culinary Union
Contracts
Under the state law trust approach, the employer is in a superior position
to dictate the terms of the trust. As in many other states, Nevada functions
under at-will employment law. Thus, the only meaningful way to vary the
terms of the trust is through the power of collective bargaining. For this reason,
Culinary Worker’s Union contracts serve a key role in the analysis. Such con-
tracts vary the terms of the trust under the state law approach so that the
employer is expressly precluded from taking an active role in the trust relation-
ship. However, as discussed below, the language leaves open the question of
which party then becomes the trustee, and to what degree of control that party
has over the terms of the tip allocation. This becomes especially important to
secondarily-tipped employees, who themselves become third-party
beneficiaries.
With the exclusion of a handful of properties, every major casino hotel on
the Las Vegas Strip (“Strip”) is a party to collective bargaining agreements
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(“Contract(s)”) with the Culinary Worker’s Union (“Union”).120 Over time, as
separate operators have merged into larger companies, the Contracts’ language
has become relatively uniform across the Strip. For example, language found in
the Contracts affecting every Strip property owned and operated by MGM
Resorts121 can be found in the Contracts affecting virtually every Strip resort
owned and operated by Caesars Entertainment.122 The similarities in language
can also be traced to the Wynn’s Contract with the Union.
With respect to gratuities, the Contracts feature identical language and
placement in Article 5 of each of the Contracts. However, while containing the
exact language in Article 5.02: Gratuities, the Wynn Contract includes addi-
tional language, which the others do not. First, consider the following language
contained in the first paragraph of Article 5.02 of each of the Contracts:
All gratuities left by customers are the property of the employees exclusively, and no
Employer or department heads not covered by this Agreement shall take any part of
such gratuities or credit the same in any manner toward the payment of an
employee’s wages . . . .123
This language is further understood through the Contracts’ definition of an
employee, which appears at Article 1.01: Recognition of the Union.124 That
article defines the term “employee” as: “all employees working in classifica-
tions listed in Exhibit 1 are properly within the bargaining unit.”125 Exhibit 1 is
a wage scale, which lists each classification of bargaining unit employee cov-
ered by the Contract. Among other restaurant and bar classifications, the Con-
tracts list several categories of primarily-tipped employees,126 as well as
several categories of secondarily-tipped employees.127
By itself, this language operates like NRS § 608.160 in that it prevents the
employer from taking tips from any employee for direct financial benefit
“[w]here the employer actually pockets and retains the tips to the exclusion of
120 Liz Benston, Culinary Agrees to Wage Freeze, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 20, 2009, at 2.
121 This portfolio includes Bellagio, Aria, Vdara, MGM Grand, The Signature at MGM
Grand, Mandalay Bay, Mirage, Monte Carlo, New York-New York, Luxor, Excalibur and
Circus Circus, see Company Overview, MGM RESORTS, http://mgmresorts.investorroom.
com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) and Las Vegas Union Guide, CULINARY WORKERS UNION,
http://culinaryunion226.org/patronize.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
122 This portfolio includes Caesars Palace, Paris Las Vegas, Planet Hollywood, Harrah’s
Las Vegas, Flamingo Las Vegas, Bally’s Las Vegas and the Rio; Las Vegas Union Guide,
supra note 121.
123 Mandalay Bay Contract, supra note 54, at 7; see also Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 4-5, Carter
v. Wynn Las Vegas, 2:10-cv-01868 (2010) ECF No. 17 (quoting Art. 5.02 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between Wynn Las Vegas and the Local Joint Executive Board of
Las Vegas 2005 – 2015) [hereinafter ECF No. 17].
124 Id.
125 Mandalay Bay Contract, supra note 54, at 2; see also ECF No. 17, supra note 124, at
15.
126 For example, the Mandalay Bay Contract lists the following: Specialty/Gourmet Room
Server, Specialty Gourmet Captain, Buffet Server, Cocktail Server, Head Bartender and
Regular Bartender. Mandalay Bay Contract, supra note 54, at 79-82.
127 For example, the Mandalay Bay Contract lists the following: Sommelier, Specialty/
Gourmet Room Bus Person, Head Bus Person, Runner, Apprentice Bartender, Apprentice
Service Bartender, and Hosts. Id. at 79-81.
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its employees . . . .”128 Unlike NRS § 608.160, it operates to prevent the
employer from taking a bargaining unit employee’s tips, so as to reallocate
them to any other employee. However, the next clauses in the Wynn Contract
distinguish it from that of the MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment
Contracts.
In the sections that follow, the analysis will begin with a discussion of the
Article 5.02 language in the MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment Con-
tracts. The language specific to those Contracts is identical, and clearly bars
management (and the Culinary Union by implication) from directing tip alloca-
tion among the bargaining unit employees. For example, if a primarily-tipped
employee, or for that matter an entire group of primarily-tipped employees,
choose to change the way they allocate tips to secondarily-tipped employees,
there is no redress available to those secondarily-tipped employees should they
not approve of the change—at least not through the grievance procedures. This
then leaves the only viable option for mandatory resolution in the hands of the
state courts.
For this reason, the analysis will first consider the effect of the language
against the baseline of the trust assumption under state law. The analysis will
then turn to litigation that has arisen out of the Article 5.02 language as it
relates to the Wynn properties. That litigation has been taken up in Nevada’s
Federal District Court. The plaintiffs are several bartenders, cocktail servers
and server assistants at the nightclubs Tryst and XS, located at Wynn and
Encore, respectively. The plaintiffs are suing the Wynn for breach of contract
with respect to its mandatory tip allocation.
1. Case Study One: Displacement of the State Law Trust Approach
under Contract Terms at the MGM Resorts and Caesars
Entertainment Properties
With the exception of the MGM Grand property, the state law trust
approach discussed above is varied by contract at every property operated by
MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment by the following language:
All gratuities left by customers are the property of the employees exclusively, and no
Employer or department heads not covered by this Agreement shall take any part of
such gratuities . . . . Except as provided otherwise in this Agreement, employees shall
not be required to divide their gratuities with any other person(s), and they shall not
be coerced or discriminated against to cause them to do so.129
As discussed above,130 the term employee used in the first sentence is
defined to exclude all but those classifications represented by the bargaining
unit. This leaves the tip allocation determination in the hands of the employees.
However, the language does not determine how the employees’ property inter-
est in the tip is defined. Said differently, there is no clear directive for how the
tip allocation is determined or by whom. Therefore, under this language, the
128 Labor Comm’r, supra note 85, at 16 (discussing the meaning of the term “take” as that
term is used in NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.160 (1973)).
129 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Caesars Palace and Local Joint Exec. Board
of Las Vegas 2002-2007, at 6 [hereinafter Caesars Contract]; Mandalay Bay Contract, supra
note 54, at 7.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 125-128.
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state law trust overlay is removed from the Nexus of the Tip model. The rela-
tionship of the QB and the tipped employees is thus direct and may be viewed
as follows:
FIGURE 7
Recall the hypothetical following Figure 1. Step 1 in Figure 7 represents
the point at which the QB has transferred his property rights in the money he
leaves as a tip. The precise point at which the tip has passed through the bottom
line of the “Bestowment Inquiry & Property Rights” triangle and entered the
“Contract Rights to the Bestowment” triangle is likely specific to policies
maintained by each employer.131 Under the MGM Resorts and Caesars
Entertainment Culinary Contracts, each property’s respective tip refund policy
is likely the extent to which those employers may involve themselves in the
property right to the tip. Beyond that, however, any secondary distribution of
the tip is in the hands of the tipped employees themselves.
The existence of Article 5.02 in the Contract varies the trust relationship
under state law, and gives rise to a third-party beneficiary status in the seconda-
rily-tipped employee. There are two ways through which this may occur. The
first is under the employment contract between the employer and the primarily-
tipped employee. The second is under a contract between primarily-tipped
employees subsequent to their forty-shift probationary period under the Culi-
nary Contracts.
One may assume that under the MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment
Culinary Contracts that the primarily-tipped employees have agreed to allocate
portions of the primary tip to secondarily-tipped staff. One may further assume
131 For example, where a customer leaves a tip, and for any number of reasons later decides
they left too much, they may come back to the restaurant and ask for some of the tip to be
returned. If they do so five minutes after they have initially left, the employer may require
the server to return the portion the guest is requesting. In the circumstance where the cus-
tomer is disputing a gratuity amount they only became aware of when they received their
credit card statement later in the month, the employer will not be able to so simply refund the
tip as in the previous example. Policies respecting this second example may vary depending
on the circumstances underlying the dispute.
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that they have initially done so as a condition of employment, the existence of
Article 5.02 notwithstanding. This is because under all the MGM Resorts and
Caesars Entertainment Culinary Contracts, the employer retains a right to dis-
miss all new hires without recourse to the grievance procedure for the first forty
shifts worked.132 Thus, the employer could establish a tip-pool system for new
outlets, and the employees would not be able to vary the terms until they com-
pleted the probationary employment period. This then establishes state at-will
employment as the default contract until the probationary period is over and
recourse to the grievance procedure becomes effective.
The Supreme Court of Nevada recently reiterated, “contractual obligations
can be implicit in employer practices and policies.”133 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that an employer may unilaterally modify the terms of an at-will
employment contract with the employee’s continued employment constituting
sufficient consideration for the modification.134 The Court recognized that at-
will employees have no contractual rights arising from the employment rela-
tionship that limit the employer’s ability to either: (1) prospectively hire and
fire employees, or (2) change the terms of employment.135 Thus, while the
primarily-tipped employees are within the probationary term of forty shifts, the
grievance provisions of the contract have not attached, and they have therefore
entered into a constructive at-will employment contract with the employer. If
the employer has set the terms of the tip allocation for secondarily-tipped staff,
it has assumed the role of trustee and contracted with the primarily-tipped
employees not only to serve in their role giving rise to the tip, but also in their
role as agents of the trustee.
Consider this in the restaurant context. The employer, Big Casino, has just
opened the Restaurant. The employer has explained to the newly hired prima-
rily-tipped staff that the tip allocation will be administered through a tip-pool.
All the food servers (primarily-tipped employees) will pool gross tips received
on their respective shifts. Servers will evenly divide fifty percent of the gross
tips among themselves. The remaining amount will be divided evenly among
the bussers, hosts, and food-runners (secondarily-tipped staff). This may be
illustrated as follows:
132 Mandalay Bay Contract, supra note 54, at 50; Caesars Contract, supra note 130, at 44.
Both contracts share identical language which states: “An employee will be considered as a
probationary employee until he/she has completed forty (40) shifts of work after his/her most
recent date of hire by the Employer. A probationary employee may be terminated at the
discretion of the Employer, and such termination shall not be subject to the grievance and
arbitration provisions of Article 21.”
133 Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, 194 P.3d 96, 105 (Nev. 2008) (quoting D’Angelo v.
Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 213 (Nev. 1991)).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 106.
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FIGURE 8
At step 1 in Figure 8, the employer offers continued employment to the
primarily-tipped employee on condition that they agree to a certain tip alloca-
tion by which the employer intends to give a benefit of a certain percentage of
the tip to the secondarily-tipped employee. At step 2, the primarily-tipped
employee accepts the offer with continued employment constituting sufficient
consideration. Thus, the employment contract is formed. That process of con-
tract formation gives rise to step 3, whereby the secondarily-tipped employee
acquires the status of intended beneficiary. This is because the primarily-tipped
employee promises to act as the employer’s agent, and in that role promises to
allocate from the gross tip a certain amount for the benefit of the secondarily-
tipped employee. The employer has conferred the right of performance from its
agent (the primarily-tipped employee) upon the beneficiary (the secondarily-
tipped employee). Therefore, the employer is the trustee; the secondarily-tipped
employee the beneficiary.
When a contract confers the status of intended beneficiary upon a third
party, this does not only mean that performance must be rendered to or for the
third party’s benefit. It also means that the contract manifests the intent to grant
the beneficiary an independent cause of action to enforce the promise.136 Thus,
we may assume that once the terms of the tip allocation under the at-will
employment contract are in place, and the primarily-tipped employee has given
sufficient consideration through their continued employment, the status of
third-party beneficiary has arisen in the secondarily-tipped employee. However,
because the provisions of the Culinary Contract become effective after the pro-
bationary period has terminated, the employer’s ability to unilaterally modify
the contract ceases.
The enforceability of the at-will employment contract giving rise to the
intended beneficiary in the secondarily-tipped employee is likely temporary at
best. This is because the contract may be limited to a term of forty shifts
worked by all the tipped-employees who were parties to the contract, at the
completion of which the contract expires. Similarly, once the probationary
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
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period ends, the primarily-tipped employees may fairly argue that the terms of
the ‘temporary’ at-will employment contract contemplate the option of new
terms by virtue of the language in Article 5.02.137 This brings us to the second
way Article 5.02 gives rise to the third-party beneficiary in the secondarily-
tipped staff: under a contract between primarily-tipped employees subsequent
to their forty-shift probationary period.
Return for a moment to the Restaurant that Big Casino just opened.
Assume the at-will employment contract is temporary; the employees are under
the Culinary Contract. Assume further that all the food servers are hired on the
same day, and that on day fifty-one following their hire date, they will have
completed their probationary period, and then among themselves they will
revisit the terms of the tip allocation. Upon doing so, they reset the allocation
by first agreeing that they will continue to pool their tips. They will retain 55%
of the gross tips among themselves. The remaining amount, 45% will then be
divided evenly among the bussers, hosts, and food-runners. This may be illus-
trated as follows:
FIGURE 9
At step 1 in Figure 9, individual food servers offer to enter into a contract
to pool their individual tips with all the other food servers. At step 2, all the
other food servers accept the individual’s offer with a promise in return to
evenly distribute 55% of the total pool among the individual primarily-tipped
employees. At step 3, they agree that the remaining 45% of the gross tip will be
distributed evenly among all the bussers, hosts, and food-runners. By manifest-
ing their intent to give the benefit of the 45% to the secondarily-tipped staff—
by electing to create the beneficiary status as part of their agreement—they
have conferred upon the secondarily-tipped staff the right to enforce the benefit
because it is apparent the parties intended to give them that right. While the
secondarily-tipped staff will not likely be happy with this outcome, they are not
entirely without remedy.
137 See supra text accompanying note 131.
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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 provides for the protection
of a beneficiary’s actual or potential reliance on a contract.138 To the extent that
beneficiaries have received no indication to the contrary, they are justified in
relying on the promise.139 If in reliance upon that promise, the beneficiary has
materially changed position, such as in buying a home, then that change of
position may operate to preclude subsequent modification of the contract with-
out consent.140 In other words, at some point after the contract is made, the
benefit vests in the beneficiary, and becomes irrevocably settled on him so that
it cannot be changed or withdrawn by the contracting parties without his
consent.
This leaves two possibilities whereby the benefit may vest. First, it may
vest under the default at-will employment contract. Of course, because the
Contract expressly notices the forty-shift probationary period to all employees
under the Contract, one may reasonably conclude that the Contract provides
constructive notice of the potential for modification after the probationary
period is over. Second, the benefit may vest at some point after the probation-
ary period expires. The longer the primarily-tipped employees proceed without
modifying the tip allocation, the more secondarily-tipped employees may rely
on that inaction. In turn, this operates to vest their beneficiary interest in the tip
allocation.
2. Case Study Two: Carter v. Wynn Las Vegas
The previous section developed the third-party beneficiary relationship as
between tipped employees where primarily-tipped employees are the only par-
ties with initial voting rights to the tip allocation “contract.” However, there is
room for variation on this model. This section explores a modification on the
Nexus of the Tip. That is, where the terms of the contract expressly contem-
plate that primarily- and secondarily-tipped staff both have voting rights as to
formation of tip allocation agreements. In the discussion that follows, this leads
to third-party beneficiary status arising not in the traditional secondarily-tipped
classifications, but rather in management itself.
In December 2010, a group of employees including bartenders, cocktail
servers, and server assistants at the nightclubs Tryst and XS filed suit in the
United States District Court, District of Nevada.141 The plaintiffs have alleged
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith, conversion and unjust
enrichment.142 Essentially, the plaintiffs seek to demonstrate that the defendant
employer’s policy is in violation of its terms in Article 5.02.143 The policy
mandates that employees at the nightclubs share their nightly tips with manage-
ment personnel not covered by Exhibit 1 of the Wynn Contract.144 As dis-
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(3) (1981).
139 Id. at § 311 cmt. g.
140 Id.
141 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 4-5, Carter v. Wynn Las Vegas, No. 2:10-cv-
01868 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2010) ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Am. Compl.].
142 Id. at 9-11.
143 Id. at 9.
144 Because this Note is focused on the issue of understanding property and contract rights
in the tip, the analysis considers only the Contract’s mechanism for varying the terms under
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cussed in detail below, the Wynn Contract requires the formation of a tip
committee composed of tipped bargaining unit employees along with represent-
atives of Wynn to determine a tip-pool allocation formula.145
The plaintiffs allege that for approximately the last four years in the case
of Tryst, and from the date of XS’s grand opening on New Year’s Eve 2009,
the employer had instituted a practice of requiring the tipped workers to share
their tips with their managers.146 The system they allege that was in place oper-
ated whereby “[t]he managers would write the amount owed them on the back
of the nightly printed tip sheet, and then the lead bartenders would pay out that
amount to the managers then scribble over the number to erase it.”147 In addi-
tion to seeking compensatory damages, the Union workers also seek to overturn
that practice in favor of the guidelines set forth in the Wynn Contract.148
The key article driving tip allocation in the Wynn Contract is Article
5.02.149 The pertinent language in that section is:
All gratuities left by customers are the property of the employees and no employee or
department heads not covered by this Agreement shall take any part of such gratuities
or credit the same in any manner toward the payment of an employee’s wages, except
as otherwise provided by the Agreement. Wynn at its sole option may institute pro-
grams whereby gratuities are pooled and disbursed on a pro-rata basis to employees
based on hours worked. Wynn along with a gratuity committee for the outlet may
determine and publish a formula that allocates a portion of the tips to any other
classifications that have taken part in the service for which the original tip was
given. If the gratuity committee and management cannot resolve the means of tip
distribution, the Secretary Treasurer of the Union and the President of Wynn or their
designees will be the final arbiters of any remaining issues. Management will be
prohibited from receiving any other monies from employees outside the decisions of
the gratuity committee.150
Several aspects of this language are worth noting. If, as in the MGM
Resorts Contract, the first sentence was not modified by the exceptions that
follow it in the Wynn Contract, then the tips received by Wynn’s employees
would be subject to the analysis in the section above. However, the first excep-
tion states, “Wynn at its sole option may institute programs whereby gratuities
are pooled and disbursed . . . .” This phrase suggests that Wynn may unilater-
ally determine the allocation, thus enabling Wynn to reallocate the tips through
tip-pools in the same manner they can under NRS § 608.160. However, when
read with Article 5.02, Exhibit 1 of the Contract ostensibly limits this possibil-
ity to those bargaining unit classifications employed at Tryst and XS. There-
fore, the Contract operates to exclude managers from the tip-pool—unless, as
the state law trust approach discussed above. The issues arising under federal labor law with
respect the Tryst and XS litigation are outside the scope of this Note.
145 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Wynn Las Vegas and the Local Joint Exec.
Bd. of Las Vegas 2005-2015, 4 [hereinafter Wynn Contract].
146 Am. Compl., supra  note 141, at 3, 6.
147 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Wynn Las Vegas, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 10, Carter v. Wynn Las Vegas, No. 2:10-cv-0186 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 2011) ECF No.
22 [hereinafter ECF No. 22].
148 Am. Compl., supra note 141, at 13.
149 Wynn Contract, supra note 145, at 4.
150 Id. (emphasis added to language specific to the Wynn Contract as distinguished from
Mandalay Bay and Caesars Entertainment Contracts).
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the last sentence of the quoted paragraph provides, the gratuity committee
should deem otherwise.
The third sentence clarifies that while Wynn may require a tip-pool, and
that the allocation may be distributed on a pro-rata basis for hours worked, the
actual formula employed in making the determination is not a matter of Wynn’s
sole discretion. Instead, Wynn, along with a gratuity committee for the outlet,
must make that determination. The language further modifies the formula to
include “any other classifications that have taken part in the service for which
the original tip was given.”151
The problem, however, is that the process of gratuity committee formation
is not specified in the Wynn Contract. Moreover, not all outlets covered under
the Wynn Contract have gratuity committees.152 To the extent they do, their
formation has apparently occurred in a manner that is specific to the outlet,
rather than through any stated or posted policy that applies property-wide.153
Consider that the plaintiffs have chosen to litigate the case rather than
consent to the formation of a gratuity committee pursuant to section 5.02.154 In
their court documents, the plaintiffs state that the tip committee was initially
formed in September of 2010.155 The plaintiffs’ documents further state that in
“October of 2010, the Tip Committee elected members. At the direction of
Wynn, Management Personnel were included as members of the Tip Commit-
tee.”156 This suggests that the Wynn management personnel formed at least
part of the committee without indicating on what basis. Nevertheless, what
remains unclear is exactly who initially formed the committee, and by what
process they formed it.
The initial tip committee for the nightclubs included slots for two cocktail
servers, two bartenders, two server assistants, two barbacks and two manag-
ers.157 Notably, the committee consisted of two representatives from each of
the designated classifications.158 Subsequently, Wynn and both the Culinary
and Bartenders’ Unions reformed the tip committees to include slots for three
bartenders, five cocktail servers, one bar-back, and four server assistants.159
Given that the Article 5.02 language has been in place since the Wynn
Resort opened in mid-2005, one could reasonably conclude that the employer
and the Unions would have instituted a well-established and functional proce-
dure prior to the current litigation. Indeed, attorneys for Wynn Las Vegas, the
Culinary Union, and the Bartender’s Union have been involved in the forma-
151 Id.
152 Interview with anonymous source, Las Vegas, Nev. (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter May 18
Interview].
153 Id.
154 ECF No. 22, supra note 147, at 11.
155 Id. at 12.
156 Id. (internal citations omitted).
157 May 18 Interview, supra note 152.
158 While the plaintiffs’ court documents suggest that there were no bartenders representing
their classification on the Tip Committee, a conversation with several sources close to the
case indicates that is not correct. According to those sources, the September Tip Committee
included two bartender representatives on both the Tryst and XS tip committees.
159 Interview with anonymous source, Las Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Mar. 22
Interview].
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tion and re-formation of the tip committees at Tryst and XS.160 This fact fairly
raises two issues. The first issue is whether their current procedures comport to
the standard set forth in Article 5.02, including the method for determining: (1)
the formula for how many representative slots from each classification would
be included on the tip committee, (2) the subsequent selection process, and (3)
the resulting allocation formula. The second issue is whether, under the third-
party beneficiary analysis discussed above, this process is legitimate at all.
With three nightclubs and as many as thirty-four food and beverage out-
lets161 under the Culinary Contract,162 the potential for variation on tip com-
mittee formation in each of these outlets is tremendous. Moreover, consider the
potential money at issue. Food and beverage revenues for the third quarter in
2010 were $111.8 million.163 If we multiply that number by a modest 15%
average tip, the 2010 third quarter tip allocation in gross could reasonably be
$16.77 million. Depending on the outcome of the Tryst and XS litigation, the
remaining nightclub and other food and beverage outlets under the Culinary
Contract may seek to revisit their own tip allocations. Certainly, this fact cannot
be lost on Wynn, given the amount of compensation the tip allocation at the
remaining outlets may be providing for managers. One very distinct possibility
is that the re-formation of the tip committees at Tryst and XS suggests that the
formula used thus far at Wynn’s other outlets could be challenged against the
standard ultimately established for the two nightclubs.
Recall that the fourth sentence in Article 5.02 provides a method for
resolving any dispute arising from the means of tip distribution. Specifically,
the article provides that “the Secretary Treasurer of the Union and the President
of Wynn or their designees will be the final arbiters of any remaining
issues.”164 However, should these final arbiters themselves disagree over how
to resolve those issues, there is one final step in the process: arbitration.165
Wynn Las Vegas argues that if the process that Article 5.02 outlines does not
resolve the issue, then the issue becomes a grievance subject to Article 21.03:
Procedure for Adjusting Grievances.166
160 Id.
161 Matt Maddox, Wynn Resorts, Presentation to the Gaming Investment Forum 2010, at 5
(2010); available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDA0
OTgzfENoaWxkSUQ9NDEzODgyfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1.
162 The Wynn Contract features an ownership clause at Article 29.01. Essentially, it
prescribes that the Contract extends to all employees in classifications listed in Exhibit 1,
which employed in operations that are “owned by, operated by, or substantially under con-
trol of [Wynn Las Vegas].” However, the Culinary Union and the employer may vary these
terms through side letter agreements. These agreements may provide for the exclusion of a
particular outlet from becoming unionized.
163 Press Release, Wynn Resorts, Limited Reports Third Quarter Results (Nov. 2, 2010)
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/staging/phoenix.zhtml?c=132059&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1490
653&highlight=‘target=.
164 Wynn CBA, supra note 146, at 4 (emphasis added).
165 Id.
166 Defendant Wynn Las Vegas, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Carter v.
Wynn Las Vegas, 2:10-cv-01868 (D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2011) ECF No. 17 (discussing Wynn
Contract, supra note 145, at 42-43).
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The remaining issue is whether under the third-party beneficiary analysis
discussed above,167 this process can be challenged, and if so, by whom? When
all the bargaining unit employees at Wynn voted to ratify the Culinary Contract
with their employer, they agreed to Article 5.02’s provisions which require that
tipped employees contract to pool their individual tips with all the other tipped
workers that take part in the service for which the primary tip is given. Rather
than contemplating traditional secondarily-tipped employees168 as third-party
beneficiaries, the initial tip agreements169 at Tryst and XS contemplate the
managers as third-party beneficiaries. This is because the terms of the Wynn
CBA grant an express right to the traditional secondarily-tipped employees to
enter into a tip allocation contract with the primarily-tipped employees.170 This
contract is expressly crafted either to convey or not convey the benefit of a
secondary tip to management, which can be reflected in the Nexus of the Tip
model as follows:
FIGURE 10
At step 1 in Figure 10, the individual tipped employees in each job classi-
fication vote for a representative or representatives to the tip committee. At step
2, the tip committee then negotiates and determines through a vote whether
managers will be included in the tip-pool. At step 3 (which may occur simulta-
neously with step 2), Wynn and the tip committee will determine and publish
the tip allocation formula. If that allocation formula includes managers in the
pool, then at step 4, the managers become third-party beneficiaries. Provided
that their rights have vested, the contract for tip allocation manifests the intent
to grant those managers an independent cause of action to enforce the
promise.171
167 See supra, section III.B.1.
168 In this case the bar backs and server assistants would be the secondarily-tipped
employees.
169 Recall that these tip agreements are the subject of the current litigation. See text accom-
panying footnotes 141-149.
170 Mar. 22 Interview, supra note 159.
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
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However, as discussed above,172 the point at which the managers’ rights
as third-party beneficiaries in that contract have vested is dependent on the
facts and circumstances of their reliance on the benefit. In the case of Tryst,
more than four years have passed since the current tip agreement was put in
place, and in the case of XS, more than two years have passed since it opened
under the current tip agreement, yet the primarily-tipped employees did not
execute the provisions under Article 5.02. Taken together, this suggests that
reliance upon the promise likely caused the managers to materially change their
position. Therefore, the benefit may have vested in the managers—the third-
party beneficiaries—becoming irrevocably settled on them, not to be changed
or withdrawn without their consent.
In conclusion, when the trust beneficiaries replace the state law trust
approach by contract, the ancillary effect is the creation of a third-party benefi-
ciary interest in the secondarily-tipped employee. Under the state law trust
approach, tipped employees must yield to the employer-trustee if it unilaterally
modifies the tip allocation terms. This is not necessarily so where the trust
beneficiaries opt to displace the trust, as we have seen with the examples of the
Culinary Contracts.
On the one hand, where primarily-tipped employee classifications decide
unilaterally to modify the tip allocation after the Culinary Contract probation-
ary period has run, it may be challenged under the third-party beneficiary the-
ory discussed above. On the other hand, where the Culinary Contract
contemplates a method for legitimizing the determination of tip allocation, that
process, if handled ad hoc, may nevertheless be challenged. This is what is
occurring at the Wynn properties. In both cases, contracts contemplating tip
allocation to third parties arise either between the employer and the primarily-
tipped employee, or between the individual primarily-tipped employee and the
class of primarily-tipped employees. In either case, where those contracts for
tip allocation contemplate conferring a benefit to the secondarily-tipped
employee, they give rise to the status of third-party beneficiary in that
employee. As a result, employees who may fairly claim this status may chal-
lenge any re-formation of the tip allocation contract on the basis of their vested
third-party rights.
Because such challenges come down to disputes between employees,
which both the unions and the employer are expressly prohibited from interfer-
ing with (in the case of the MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment Con-
tracts), these disputes are not subject to the grievance procedures under the
Contracts, and may be litigated. The challenge in the case of the Wynn Con-
tract is more complex because it may involve a combination of a challenge
between the employees, and a challenge between the employees and a determi-
nation made by a union officer as well as a corporate officer. For this reason,
there is more than one way to validly take the challenge to court rather than go
through the motions of a grievance procedure.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 168-171.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Through a review of the tipping custom’s history and nomenclature, this
Note has introduced the reader to a working understanding of the fundamental
basis of the tip. Its origins in western culture go back centuries. The reasons
that consumers tip are many, and yet imputing their intent to tip for any particu-
lar reason or to any particular person in the line of service remains an inquiry
that yields imprecise results. Perhaps the best formulation of this intent is to
reduce it to our understanding of the employer’s superior position under at-will
employment at common law. Nevertheless, it is helpful to the practitioner to
understand the tension between the perspectives of the primarily-tipped
employee and the employer–that is, to understand the implications if one
imputes the qualified bestower’s intent to tip the server, or merely the service.
Because the latter approach favors the employer, it is important to understand
that under Nevada state law, a qualified bestower’s intent to tip the service
gives rise to a trust relationship between the parties at the Nexus of the Tip. If a
practitioner uses this as a baseline approach, the practitioner is armed with an
understanding of the ramifications of variations on this approach in any at-will
employment state.
Where beneficiaries find themselves in a position to replace the trust
approach in favor of a contract, the case studies expose traps for the unwary.
Therefore, the practitioner should make sure that beneficiaries understand the
ramifications of the terms of their contract. This means when they enter into
contracts to allocate tips to third-party beneficiaries, they may be inextricably
bound to those terms unless they have otherwise expressly so provided. For this
reason, it is imperative that practitioners pay careful attention to contract terms
allocating tips on behalf of their clients, or the resulting price may indeed be
great.
